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Social Policies in the Middle East and North Africa
Ferdinand Eibl, King's College London
Abstract
This article provides a succinct overview of trends in social policy provision in the Middle
East and North Africa since the late 1950s. The main argument made in this piece is that
the region underwent a period of social policy divergence up until the mid-1970s, followed
by increasing convergence of social policy provision. This is demonstrated with reference to
educational, health, and social security policies. The article also provides a brief outline of
the historical legacies of social policies in the region, arguing that these were not the root
of the divergence that occurred in the post-colonial period. Rather, the key driver of this
divergence was diﬀerences in the composition of the regimes' ruling coalitions: republican
regimes adopted a strategy of populist mobilisation toward the working and middle class;
monarchical regimes opted for a strategy of selective co-optation of (tribal) notables, business
elites, and the armed forces. The article also highlights major challenges of social policies
in the region, such as problems of inclusion, equity, and long-term eﬀects on distributive
expectations, and highlights their political economy underpinnings.
(Key words: Middle East and North Africa; social policy; political economy; education;
health; welfare state; JEL codes: I1; I2; I3; N15; P16)
Introduction
Since the late 1950s, social policies and welfare distribution have been major areas of government
activity across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), yet the region has been the stepchild
of global social policy research.1 With a few notable exceptions (Karshenas and Moghadam, 2006;
Gal and Jawad, 2013; Jawad and Yakut-Cakar, 2010; Cammett, 2011, 2014; Loewe, 2010), social
policies in the Middle East have neither received much attention of the ever-growing welfare
state and development economics literature, nor have they attracted much scholarly attention
from area specialist. This is all the more surprising given the extension and ﬁnancial weight of
MENA social policies in regional comparison. In terms of the number of social security areas
covered, such as old age, health, or unemployment, the MENA region ranks third behind Latin
America and the Central Asia and Caucasus region, ahead of Asia and sub-Saharan Africa (Figure
1). Regarding ﬁnancial commitment to social welfare, the region is on a par with other high-
spending regions in the developing world, dedicating about 8% of its GDP to social expenditures
by the late 2000s (Figure 2). Moreover, these average ﬁgures mask the remarkable performance of
a number of MENA countries, such as Tunisia, Algeria, and the Islamic Republic of Iran, which
have consistently spent about half of their budget on social welfare and whose social security
systems have covered at least two thirds of their population (Ben Romdhane, 2006; Ouzzir, 2006;
Harris, 2010).
That said, social policy regimes in the Middle East have also shown considerable variation
in terms of their ability to reach vulnerable populations, their distributive eﬀects, and their
1This article follows the World Bank deﬁnition of MENA. I will use the term Middle East in a broad sense
including North African countries. As a member state of the OECD, Israel is not considered in this article at it
exhibits a diﬀerent socio-economic structure to most other MENA states.
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level of stratiﬁcation and accessibility. These diﬀerences in policy choices are reinforced by the
tremendous variation in national wealth across the region, which is mainly an artefact of unequal
endowments with natural resources. In fact, the region encompasses both the world's richest
nations (e.g., Qatar, Kuwait) whose oil wealth have enabled them to build generous welfare
states for the native populations, and some of the world's poorest nations (e.g., Yemen, Sudan)
whose feeble ﬁnancial capacity has additionally been shattered by persistent violent conﬂict. To
deal with this issue, I will, where appropriate, distinguish between the six oil-rich monarchies of
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)  Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates (UAE)  and other non-GCC MENA countries. A further complication
stems from the fact that social policies in a number of MENA countries have been poorly studied
and data are thus limited. I am therefore compelled to focus on the better researched countries
in the region. Finally, this article focuses on state-provided social policies and leaves the issue of
non-state welfare provision to a separate, future article.
Figure 1: Extent of social protection by region (mid-late 2000s)
Source: ILO 2014.
Note: CAC Central Asia and Caucasus; EA East Asia; LAC Latin America and
Caribbean; MENA Middle East and North Africa; SA South Asia; SEA South-East
Asia; SSA Sub-Saharan Africa.
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Figure 2: Total social expenditures by region (mid-late 2000s)
Source: ILO 2014.
Note: CAC Central Asia and Caucasus; EA East Asia; LAC Latin America and
Caribbean; MENA Middle East and North Africa; SA South Asia; SEA South-East
Asia; SSA Sub-Saharan Africa.
This article is structured as follows: the next section brieﬂy describes the colonial legacies
of social policies across the region. The following sections provide a succinct overview of social
policies in the Middle East, highlighting a process of, ﬁrst, divergence and, then, convergence
across the region. The third section will highlight a number of challenges in the ﬁeld of social
policy, such as problems of inclusion, equity, and long-term eﬀects on distributive expectations,
and highlight their political economy underpinnings.
Colonial legacies
Although patterns of colonial encroachment during the 19th and 20th century varied across the
region  from complete incorporation as in Algeria to very lose protectorate systems in the Gulf
 it is safe to say that social policies did not constitute a matter of priority for colonial powers.
Concerned with maintaining domestic security and economic exploitation, colonial powers across
the region left either no or only a very rudimentary social policy framework for the post-colonial
regimes to build on.
In the countries of the French Maghreb, colonial social policies were uniquely geared to the
minuscule elite of white-collar workers, frequently French nationals, and the nascent working class.
In Algeria, for instance, the French government introduced free medical assistance (assistance
medicale gratuite) only for low-income segments of the French settler population, while the native
population was left to charitable organisations (Kaddar, 1989). In Tunisia, the only major social
policy initiative was the introduction of a family allowance (allocations familiales) in 1918, a
lump-sum social transfer given for each child (Chaabane, 2002).
In Jordan, social policies in the form of free health care, housing, and education were mainly
used as part of the British eﬀort to pacify the East Bank tribes and build an eﬀective tribal
defence force tied to the newly established Hashemite ruler. It was thus instrumental, yet narrowly
conﬁned to a small segment of the population (Alon, 2007). In Egypt, British authorities laid the
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foundation for the main social assistance scheme until today  subsidisation of basic commodities
 when they introduced food subsidies to urban areas in the aftermath of World War I (Omar,
2012; Ahmed et al., 2001). Following the country's independence from the British in 1922, social
policies, especially education, received increasing interest but really only became a policy priority
following the Free Oﬃcer coup under Nasser in 1952. In Syria and especially in Lebanon, colonial
policies expanded access to health care and education rather unequally, privileging Christian and
(other) minority populations at the expense of the Muslim majority(Thompson, 2013).
Finally, in the Gulf monarchies British colonial rule had the main purpose of safeguarding
trade with India, which means that development and social policies in particular were no immedi-
ate priority for the British. In addition, economic development was tremendously low in the Gulf
sheikdoms before the onset of oil production, which for most countries only started after WWII
(Owen and Pamuk, 1998). This, in turn, meant that welfare distribution was mostly conﬁned to
charitable activity on the part of the ruler and few Christian missionaries (Niblock, 2015). With
the onset of oil production and the increasing threat from pan-Arab leftist ideologies on the rise
in the 1950s, colonial authorities in collaboration with the ruling families started to pay greater
attention to development policies, which lead to a ﬁrst noticeable expansion of health care and
education facilities . This was then followed by more fundamental shift toward rent-based welfare
states following the ﬁrst oil boom in 1973 (El-Katiri, Fattouh and Segal, 2011; Chaudhry, 1997).
Yet, even though colonialism did not entail marked diﬀerences in terms of the extent of social
provision, it still set countries on distinct paths in terms of types of social policies pursued by post-
colonial regimes. In formerly French colonies (with the partial exception of Syria), post-colonial
authorities took over predominantly Bismarckian social policy regimes which the French had
established for their own civil servants, such as the provident society for Tunisian civil servants
or the Moroccan public pension fund established in 1889 and 1930 respectively (Chaabane, 2002;
Catusse, 2009). In Algeria, the French authorities extended the existing social security regime
to the entire Algerian population themselves in a eleventh-hour attempt to win over the native
population at the onset of the Algerian war of independence (Safar Zitoun, 2009). This path
dependency in terms of policy design explains the predominance of insurance-based social security
systems in the Maghreb, especially in the area of health care. This contrasts with mostly tax-
based or mixed regimes prevalent in the countries of the Mashreq and, in a slightly diﬀerent
format, in the Gulf where most social policies are freely accessible to nationals only and ﬁnanced
through oil rents.
Social policies since the 1950s: from divergence to convergence
Broadly speaking, the development of social policies over the last six decades can be divided into
two main periods: from the early 1950s until the mid-1970s, social policies in the region were
characterised by a pattern of divergence whereby left-leaning republican regimes expanded social
policies to a growing number of beneﬁciaries, while conservative monarchical regimes remained on
the back foot and restricted social policies to key constituencies of the regime (e.g., bureaucracy,
military), yielding more segmented, corporatist welfare regimes. The key driver of this divergence
was diﬀerences in the composition of the regimes' ruling coalitions: republican regimes adopted
a strategy of populist mobilisation toward the working and middle class; monarchical regimes
opted for a strategy of selective co-optation of (tribal) notables, business elites, and the armed
forces (Hinnebusch, 2010).
However, this pattern needs to be qualiﬁed in two important respects. First, as far as the Gulf
monarchies are concerned, the combination of, in most countries, small national populations and
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ample oil revenues allowed for the rapid extension of social policies to nearly the entire population.
Saudi Arabia  by far the most populous Arab state in the Gulf  came to emulate the generosity
of its smaller neighbours after the ﬁrst oil boom in 1973 by rapidly increasing the public sector
and rolling out welfare provision. Second, expansion of social policy programmes was not only
inﬂuenced by the incentives stemming from the regimes' respective ruling coalitions. Social policy
commitments were also shaped, and in many cases hampered by, external threats emanating from
a regional environment where large-scale external conﬂicts were paramount. Resource-scarce
states that were conﬂicting parties in the Arab-Israeli conﬂict (Egypt, Syria, Jordan) faced a
particularly acute `butter or guns' trade-oﬀ between investing in national security or enlarging
the state's welfare regime. This meant that, despite their populist impetus, social policies in Egypt
and Syria were often impaired by insuﬃcient ﬁnancial and bureaucratic commitment (Eibl, 2016).
Since the mid-1970s, social policies in the region have witnessed a trend of gradual conver-
gence. This has been driven by the conﬂuence of a number of events: ﬁrst, all populist republic
regimes were forced to halt the expansion of their welfare regimes as their economic model based
on state capitalism and import substitution ran into acute balance of payment problems, which in
many cases necessitated painful IMF-led adjustment, followed by increasingly neo-liberal policies.
Second, bolstered by large oil rents Gulf monarchies rapidly caught up with and gradually sur-
passed their republican counterparts in terms of welfare generosity. Third, even resource-poor
monarchies started to pay more attention to social policies. In the case of Jordan, this coincided
with a gradual adjustment of public expenditures away from defence toward (social) development;
in Morocco, social policies increased in importance after the accession of King Mohamed VI in
2000.
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(a) Aggregate social spending as % of total expendit-
ures
(b) Education spending as % of total expenditures
(c) Health expenditures as % of total expenditures
Figure 3: Divergence and convergence of social expenditures in selected MENA regimes
Source: Lucas and Richter 2016; IMF 2011.
Note: Aggregate social spending includes outlays for education, health, housing, social security
and assistance. High-spenders denote regimes with aggregate welfare outlays consistently near
the 50-percent mark (Tunisia, Algeria, Islamic Republic of Iran). GCC countries are not included
in the graph due to a lack of consistent time-series data. Other countries included in the graph
are Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria (low spenders). Trends look very similar when using the
share of GDP instead of expenditures.
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This pattern of divergence and convergence is particularly visible when looking at the spend-
ing ﬁgures plotted in Figure 3.2 As far as spending is concerned, divergence reached a peak around
the mid-1970s, after which spending patterns started to converge. This process was particularly
pronounced in the ﬁelds of education (Figure 3b) and health (Figure 3c), although the lower
budgetary expenditures for health in high-spending countries was primarily driven by an expan-
sion of health insurance coverage and thus a shift toward a more fully insurance-based system. In
the following two sub-sections, I will describe social policies during these two periods in greater
detail, with a particular focus on education, health, and social security and assistance.
Divergence
Education
Education in all states expanded in the post-colonial period, although the pace and extent of this
extension was more pronounced in populist republic regimes. Educational expansion generally
consisted of three inter-related measures: (i) making education compulsory and removing existing
access barriers to primary, secondary, and from the early 1960s onwards, higher education; (ii)
expanding the institutional and ﬁnancial capacity of the educational system by building schools
and hiring teaching staﬀ; (iii) circumventing and, in some cases, abolishing established religious
institutions as the key provider of education. The institutional architecture of educational systems
across the region took thus a similar shape, with compulsory primary education followed by, at
ﬁrst mostly elective, secondary education divided into various academic and vocational tracks.
Enrolment ﬁgures provide a good measure of the regimes' variable commitment to educational
expansion during this time period: in Tunisia, an ambitious reform under Minister of Education
Mahmoud Messaadi led to nearly universal primary enrolment by 1968, up from 35 percent in
1950. Algeria tripled education expenditures from 10 percent in 1963 to nearly 30 percent by the
early 1970s in order to reach universal primary enrolment by 1978. In addition, nearly 65 percent
of all pupils received government scholarships to guarantee a more equitable access (Bennoune,
1988). Lebanon had equally achieved full primary and 42 percent secondary enrolment in the
mid-1970s
In Egypt and Syria  two front-line states in the Arab-Israeli conﬂict  the picture was more
mixed: while the amount of primary schools double in Egypt between 1952 and 1976 (Waterbury,
1983) and the number of primary students doubled between 1964 and 1977 in Syria (Drysdale,
1981), educational expansion was impaired by ﬁnancial bottlenecks and an increasing focus on
higher education at the expense of primary education. In Morocco, Jordan, and Pahlavi Iran
educational policies were also biased in favour of secondary and higher education, preventing a
rapid expansion of access (e.g., Eilers, 1978). Morocco's primary enrolment rate in the mid-1970s
stood at a meagre 54 percent, and Jordan outsourced much of its educational policies toward
the UN agency for Palestinian refugees (UNRWA) which came to educate large parts of the
Palestinian population in Jordan. As for the Gulf, early oil exporters with small populations,
such as Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, had achieved full primary and at least 50 percent secondary
enrolment by the mid-1970s; latecomers in terms of oil production (UAE, Oman) and the more
populous Saudi Arabia were still catching up at that point, with primary enrolment standing at
80, 34, and 57 percent respectively.
2Due to a lack of systematic data, the graph includes only a limited number of countries (see the note), but
anecdotal evidence based on fragmentary suggests a similar pattern in other MENA countries.
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1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975
Algeria primary 25 30 46 68 76.1 92.7
secondary 5 6 8 7 11.2 20
Bahrain primary 24 32 72 103 98.4 95.9
secondary - - - 33 51.3 52.4
Egypt primary - - 66 75 67.6 73.1
secondary - - 16 26 28.4 40.3
Iran primary 28 28 41 63 72.8 93.2
secondary 4 7 12 18 27.1 45
Iraq primary 24 36 65 74 68.8 93.6
secondary 5 8 19 28 24.4 34.6
Jordan primary 48 78 77 95 84.2 86.6
secondary 4 18 25 38 32.8 47.5
Kuwait primary 78 99 117 116 88.1 92.6
secondary 2 4 37 52 63.5 66.5
Lebanon primary - 77 102 106 121.4 -
secondary - 9 19 26 41.5 46.9
Libya primary 20 37 59 78 110.5 137.3
secondary 0.5 4 9 14 20.8 54.7
Morocco primary 21 30 47 57 51.5 62
secondary 1 2 5 11 12.6 16.5
Oman primary - - - - 3 37
secondary - - - - 0 1.3
Qatar primary - - 67 97 96.2 111.6
secondary - - - 15 36.3 53.8
Saudi Arabia primary 4 7 12 24 45.3 57.5
secondary 0.2 0.4 2 4 12.1 21.6
Syria primary 52 52 65 78 77.5 95.6
secondary 8 13 16 28 38.1 43
Tunisia primary 35 47 66 91 100.4 96.5
secondary 8 9 12 16 22.7 21.1
United Arab Emirates primary - - - - 94.6 101.5
secondary - - - - 21.8 32.6
Yemen primary - - 8 9 - -
secondary - - - - - -
Table 1: Gross primary and secondary enrolment, 1950-1975
Source: World Bank 2008.
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Health
In the area of health care, states not only diﬀered in the level of their ﬁnancial commitment
but also in the institutional design of their health care system. Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Egypt,
and Lebanon established a parallel structure in their health care system whereby a tax-based
public health care sector has coexisted with an insurance-based system which allows patients
access to both public and private facilities. This was often the result of post-colonial regimes
taking over existing insurance-based systems for public sector employees from the colonial period
while trying to widen health care access to the vast number of citizens without existing health
insurance. In Tunisia, the government created two health insurance funds for private and public
sector employees in 1960, while granting uninsured patients access to a practically free-of-charge
publicly funded health care system (Camau, Zaïem and Bahri, 1990). As insurance coverage
increased, Tunisia went through a process of `de-budgetisation' whereby the government gradually
apportioned the costs of health care to the public health insurance scheme. This process was
similar in Algeria where the free-of-charge system gradually came to be used by the lowest-
income segments only (CERMOC, 1992). Egypt created a system in which free-of-charge health
care is available to all citizens  though mostly avoided due to chronic underfunding  while a
parallel networks of clinics and hospitals exclusively caters to those insured in the public insurance
scheme (Clark, 2004). Lebanon takes a special position in that the expansion of public health
care was very limited and private health care provision has thus dominated (Cammett, 2014).
Other regimes opted for predominantly tax-based health care systems. Syria, for instance,
gradually established a universal health care system by enlarging the number of health card
holders, which allowed access to free health care following a means test. The regime ﬁnally
abandoned means-testing and introduced a national health service free of charge and accessible
to all Syrian citizens. However, the gradual and lengthy introduction of universal health care
meant that, for a long time, between a third and a fourth of the country's population were
neither covered by the means-tested system nor any other social insurance (Drysdale, 1981).
Access to health care was also problematic in Morocco where user fees in the public health care
were so high that they eﬀectively barred many Moroccans from access (Loewe, 2010). Pahlavi
Iran provided free health care only for public sector employees who were covered by a public
social insurance scheme. An equivalent private-sector scheme was only created in 1975, and the
vast majority of the country's rural population (90%) still lacked access to medical facilities by
the mid-1970s (Halliday, 1979). Jordan created a highly stratiﬁed system where public sectors
employees and members of the armed forces were covered by their own health insurance scheme,
while all others had to paid a subsidised fee to access health care (Knowles, 2005). The Gulf
monarchies also established tax-based systems which have provided free health care to all citizens
and, in the case of Oman, all inhabitants.
Post-colonial health care systems thus diﬀered considerably in terms of their accessibility 
with (nearly) universal access in Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, South Yemen, later Syria, and
the Gulf monarchies  and their ﬁnancial capacity. Regarding the latter, the Gulf monarchies have
certainly stood out in their ability to channel ﬁnancial resources into their health care systems, as
evidenced by their rapid decline in mortality rates. Beyond the Gulf, we ﬁnd that the populist-
conservative fault line in social policies largely holds true, with Tunisia and Algeria spending most
on health care, followed by Egypt and Syria as intermediate cases, with the non-oil monarchies
at the bottom. Access and ﬁnancial commitment were also limited in the Lebanese case where a
liberal post-war economic model coupled with a fragmented state capacity undermined large-scale
public spending, which meant relatively high out-of-pocket expenditures for the bulk of uninsured
citizens (Loewe, 2010).
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Social security and assistance
Divergence was also characteristic of other forms of social security beyond health insurance.
Populist republican regimes, on the one hand, tended to establish social security systems with a
wider outreach and better coverage for private sector workers than their monarchical counterparts.
In Tunisia, a comprehensive social security regime including health, work accidents and work-
related illnesses, as well as maternity cover was introduced between 1957 and 1960. For public
sector workers, the system also included a pension scheme, which was added for private sector
workers in 1965. Egypt similarly built its social security regime for public and private sector
workers in several steps between 1952 and 1960, including a pension, disability, and work accident
scheme as well as unemployment insurance, while adding health insurance later in 1964 with the
establishment of the Health Insurance Organisation (HIO). This system was then more or less
copied by Syria during the union with Egypt between 1958 and 1961. Libya equally established
a rather comprehensive regime for both sectors.
Resource-poor monarchies, on the other hand, established more segmented and stratiﬁed
social security systems, which were less extensive, lower in their coverage, and clearly privileged
public over private sector workers. Pahlavi Iran, for instance, only introduced a social security
scheme for private sector workers in 1975; Jordan set up the Social Security Cooperation for
private sector workers only in 1980. In Morocco, a scheme for private sector workers existed (the
Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale); however, until 2002 it did not include a health insurance
component, as only civil servants were oﬀered an optional complementary insurance. This meant
that until the mid-2000s, about 80 percent of all Moroccan were without any public health
insurance coverage. Lebanon takes a middle position in that social security systems for both
private and public sectors workers were set up, yet they gravely suﬀered from low levels of
coverage and a clear bias toward the public sector (Melki, 2000). Finally, in the Gulf monarchies
nationals working in the public sector  the vast majority  have not only beneﬁted from decent
salaries and high levels of job security, but also from a wide-ranging social security regime that
the Gulf states set up for their civil servants. That said, private sector schemes have been nearly
equally generous.
In terms of social assistance, the predominant type of transfer used throughout the region,
regardless of the regime's ideological background, has been the subsidisation of basic commodities
and energy. While the origins of this system diﬀer from country to country  such as food rationing
during the World Wars in Egypt or a bargain with labour to control wage inﬂation in Tunisia
 the uniform application of the subsidy system meant that bread, as well as other staples like
rice, milk, vegetable oil, and at times meat have been subject to strict price controls and thereby
made available at prices signiﬁcantly below the world market price. This equally applied to
energy products, such as petrol, diesel, and household gas, which have been oﬀered either for
free, as in the Gulf monarchies, or at strongly subsidised rates. By contrast, other forms of social
transfers were poorly developed and thus only existed in a rudimentary way, such as the National
Solidarity Fund in Tunisia or the Sadat pensions for the poor in Egypt.
Convergence
Education
Since the mid-1970s, educational policies in the Middle East have been characterised by three
important trends that have led to a gradual convergence between republican and monarchical
regimes:
First, levels of ﬁnancial commitment to education converged as high-spending countries were
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forced to cut back on spending due to economic diﬃculties while resource-poor monarchies hiked
up education spending. In the case of Jordan, this increase was partly the result of a peace
dividend as hostilities in the Arab-Israel conﬂict abated and a peace agreement between Israel
and Jordan made a signiﬁcant reduction of defence expenditures possible. While, in theory, this
would have also applied to Egypt, the economic situation of the country since the late 1970s
through to the 1990s was such that most freed-up resources went into debt service which, at its
peak, consumed about a quarter of public spending (Wahid, 2009). This period of retrenchment
left a noticeable toll on the country's education system, with teachers forced into moonlighting
because of low salaries, and many schools running several shifts a day to cope with the number
of students (Harik, 1997). And although education spending picked up again towards the late-
1990s, by the mid-2000s Egypt witnessed lower levels of education spending than comparable
mid-income countries (Galal and Kanaan, 2010; Soliman, 2011). Yet even countries in a less
dramatic economic situation, such as Tunisia, could not sustain the very high levels of spending
characteristic of the 1960s and 1970s, when education had consumed about a third of all public
expenditures. Reductions, however, were not as drastic as in neighbouring Egypt and Tunisia
has kept educational spending at between a quarter and a ﬁfth of the state budget. In terms of
female education, gender parity indexes in all MENA countries have reached comparable levels,
with near parity in most countries except for Iraq, Morocco, and to a lesser extent Syria (World
Bank, 2008).
Second, following a global trend in educational policies, almost all Middle Eastern countries
paved the way toward a generalisation of secondary education by loosening selective barriers
and increasing the years of compulsory education to an average of currently 9 years across the
region. This means that in all MENA countries secondary enrolment rates in the late 2010s
stood between 75 and 85 percent, with the exception of Yemen (46%), Iraq (55%), and Morocco
(58%). Concomitantly, the rise in secondary education has put pressure on the tertiary education
system to deal with the higher student numbers. On average, between a quarter and two-thirds
of an age cohort continue studying in higher education in the late 2010s. To make matters
more complicated, there is a serious problem of mismatching between the demands of the labour
markets and graduate cohorts who are more strongly drawn toward social sciences and humanities
which traditionally paved the way for a career in the public sector  in many countries historically
the main employer. By contrast, more applied and vocational degrees are often considered second-
rate and frequently do not oﬀer much clearer job market prospects either (World Bank, 2008).
Third, in the midst of demographic pressures, tight ﬁnances, and a strong demand for edu-
cational expansion, private education has expanded in a number of MENA regimes.3 While edu-
cation in traditional high-spenders, such as Algeria or Tunisia, has remained almost exclusively
public, countries in economic diﬃculties or with a less engrained commitment to public education
have witnessed increasing levels of private education. This is particularly true in the area of higher
education where middle-class demand for quality education has led to a mushrooming of private
universities, such as in Egypt or Jordan with a share of 17 and 25 percent of private institutions
respectively (World Bank, 2008; Kohstall, 2012). In Jordan, even in public universities fee levels
are comparatively high and provide universities with about a third of their total income (Galal
and Kanaan, 2010). A similar pattern of privatisation, though not driven by ﬁnancial need but
rather by expatriate demand and brand-seeking, can be observed in many Gulf countries, such
as Qatar, Oman, and the UAE. Even in primary and secondary education the share of private
enrolment has increased quite markedly, with Jordan ranking at the top of the list of non-GCC
countries with 30 percent private enrolment.
3A marked exception is Lebanon where private education has historically been very high.
11
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Algeria primary 89 89.9 93.2 103.2 106.7 113
secondary 45 58.7 57.5 61.9 76.7 95.4
Bahrain primary 111.2 110.2 107.8 103.8 - -
secondary 92.3 86.9 106.2 100 95.2 96.43
Egypt primary 79.4 92.2 92.6 01.3 105.5 113.3
secondary 55 72.9 74.1 85.8 87.6 75.8
Iran primary 100.2 105.7 106.3 100.7 101.1 106.3
secondary 44.1 52.7 70.3 78.7 76.3 81.1
Iraq primary 102 102.3 84.1 95.9 103 -
secondary 49.2 46.5 38.7 37.3 47.3 -
Jordan primary 101.9 101.6 99.8 102.4 105.6 98.8
secondary 81.5 76.4 82.2 85.9 91.8 89.9
Kuwait primary 106.1 92.7 102.4 115.4 113.9 -
secondary 88.1 76.6 85.2 114.1 111 -
Lebanon primary 101 109.8 116.7 130.9 103.6 103.4
secondary 65.1 - 74.7 92.7 80.7 74.3
Libya primary 117 - - 115.9 106.8 -
secondary 79.3 - - 112.6 99 -
Morocco primary 77.7 66.6 72.7 91.6 104.6 111.7
secondary 30.7 36.8 37.6 38.1 49.6 62.5
Oman primary 68.6 81.9 86.3 94.7 85.5 106.9
secondary 25.1 42.1 65.3 79.6 85.4 97.76
Qatar primary 110.5 98.2 97.2 104.7 102.5 -
secondary 82.8 79.9 102.5 86.4 122.5 104.3
Saudi Arabia primary - - - - 91.0 100.9
secondary - - - - 89 110.2
Syria primary 101.1 105.5 107 107 121.5 118.1
secondary 54.9 50.8 42.9 43.9 70.1 72.5
Tunisia primary 115.9 111.6 116.4 115.9 109.9 108.8
secondary 37 45.4 56.3 74.9 85.8 89
United Arab Emirates primary 95.4 108.6 104.5 94.2 104.3 112.7
secondary 68.3 62.1 82.9 83.6 - -
Yemen primary - 65.4 73.1 73 89.2 91.9
secondary 20.7 21.8 20.9 41.4 46.7 44.3
Table 2: Gross primary and secondary enrolment, 1985-2010
Source: World Bank 2008, 2012.
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Health
In the area of health care, we can also observe a gradual convergence across the region which, as
far a spending levels are concerned, has been driven by the same underlying economic factors.
However, it should be noted that in MENA countries with a well-established public health insur-
ance system, such as Algeria and Tunisia, spending reductions partly reﬂected a shift of ﬁnancial
obligations from the state budget on to the insurance system, and were not necessarily sympto-
matic of lower spending levels overall (Kaddar, 1989). Convergence was facilitated by deliberated
eﬀorts to broaden the coverage of existing social security regimes to segments of the informal
and low-income sectors, such as construction workers and domestic employees (e.g., Boudahrain,
2003). As a result, coverage rates of public health insurances have signiﬁcantly increased in all
MENA countries, with top performers such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, Algeria, and Tunisia
covering between 80 and 90 percent of their workforce. The only exception to this trend is Le-
banon where health care provision has remained predominantly private which is both due to its
weak legacy of (welfare) state building and the civil war which had propelled non-state actors into
the roles of important welfare providers. In 2005, only 5 out of 160 hospitals were government-run
(Cammett and Issar, 2010, 391).
Convergence was particularly rapid in in Iran where the post-revolutionary regime has made
social policies a key priority and lifted the country from one of the lowest spenders on social
welfare into the group of high-spenders within just one decade (Harris, 2013). This spending
boost was accompanied by a sustained eﬀort to roll out social security to the entire population,
culminating in the extension of the public health insurance scheme (Medical Care Insurance
Organisation, MCIO) to the entire population in 1994 (Messkoub, 2006). In addition, the Islamic
Revolution has also lead to the establishment of para-statal charities and foundations (boniyads)
which provide a wide range of social services including medical assistance (Harris, 2010).
The 2000s also witnessed a number of major eﬀorts to overhaul the public health insurance
in Tunisia and Morocco where it succeeded, and in Egypt where it failed. In Tunisia, the 2004
Universal Health Care Reform merged the health insurance of civil servants (Caisse Nationale de
Retraites et de Prévoyance Sociale, CNRPS) and the private sector employees (Caisse Nationale
de Sécurité Social, CNSS) into the new Caisse Nationale d'Assurance Maladie (CNAM). Being
the outcome of protracted negotiations with employers, the medical professions, and the national
trade union over a period of eight years, the reform constitutes without any doubt the most
signiﬁcant social policy reform in recent decades. The reform represented a major victory for
Tunisia's strong national trade union, UGTT, as the government's initial objective of utilising
this reform as a vehicle to partially privatise health care and implement cost-cutting measures
was reversed; instead, the reform upgraded the coverage level of private sector employees for a
minimal rise in premiums, gave the public health care system a ﬁnancial boost, and essentially
outsourced the costs of the reform to private providers.
In Morocco, health care reform in the 2000s aimed at extending the meagre coverage of the
existing public health insurance to achieve, ideally, universal coverage. To this end, the country
rolled out a mandatory employer-based health insurance scheme (Assurance Maladie Obligatoire,
AMO) in 2005, followed by the introduction of another programme for low-income households,
the Régime d'Assistance Médicale (RAMED) in 2009. In combination, both reforms have pushed
coverage levels up to about 62 percent of all households. The idea now is to further extend
RAMED to the nearly 3.4 million self-employed workers and their 6.6 million dependents, who
have thus far remained uninsured.
In Egypt, the Mubarak regime also attempted to overhaul their public health insurance in
view of achieving universal coverage. By universalising health insurance, the regime was hoping
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to address a number of defciencies in the health care system: high out-of-pocket expenditures
(72 per cent) which have been driven by uninsured Egyptians opting for private health care
instead of using the free-of-charge facilities provided by the Ministry of Health, the quality of
which is considered very low; and the fact that the current health care insurance exclusively
insures the policyholder and not any dependants (World Bank, 2015). The reform also aimed
at cost reductions to reign in the scheme's high deﬁcit and a partial privatisation of health care
at a later stage. The reform attempt failed, however, due to serious resistance of health care
professionals and existing policyholders and, crucially, due to the government's unwillingness
to shoulder the ﬁnancial cost of subsidising the premiums of up to 40 percent of the Egyptian
population. Successive post-revolutionary government have vowed to revive the project, so far to
no avail.
Social security and assistance
In the ﬁeld of social security and assistance, policies have been motivated by two major concerns:
ﬁrst, reforming existing social security systems to include a greater share of the population as
described above; second, reigning in the subsidisation system which in most countries have become
an excessive drain on ﬁscal resources since the mid-1970s. A key problem of the food, mostly
bread, and energy subsidy system is that its costs depend almost entirely on the vagaries of the
world market price  most MENA countries are net food and/or energy importers  which makes
budgets vulnerable to signiﬁcant external shocks.
As regards energy subsidies, the depth of reform varied from occasional price increases, espe-
cially for high-octane petrol used by the upper middle class, as happened in Algeria, most GCC
countries since the fall of the oil price in 2014, and post-revolutionary Egypt; to the establishment
of automatic indexation systems which still subsidise consumer prices but move them along the
world market price within a certain range, as introduced in post-revolutionary Tunisia; to the
partial or full abolishment of energy subsidies as occurred in Morocco, Jordan, and Iran. The
Iranian reform was particularly commended internationally as the country replaced energy sub-
sidies with a unconditional cash transfer, which greatly improved public acceptance for reform,
although the implementation of the reform has faltered since 2012 (IMF, 2014).
As for food subsidies, reforms have mainly consisted of a combination of three diﬀerent layers:
(i) eliminating less essential commodities, such as certain meats, ﬁsh, etc. from the list of subsid-
ised goods; (ii) improving targeting and avoiding leakage into the black market by handing out
smart cards to beneﬁciaries and tightening controls on producers; (iii) occasional price increases
mainly to alleviate acute ﬁscal pressures during periods of international price hikes. While these
measures have certainly made the system more manageable, a legacy of food riots from the 1970s
and 1980s coupled with a well-organised lobby on the part producers of subsidised goods has so
far prevented the creation of an alternative social assistance scheme which would guarantee food
security and at the same allow for a much better targeting of low-income populations. Some
countries have boosted the ﬁnancial capacity of other social assistance schemes to better reach
vulnerable population, such as Tunisia's programme of Families in Need (Programme d'Aide aux
Familles Nécessiteuses, PNAFN). These measures, however, have remained small in scale and
unable to provide a viable, ﬁnancially sustainable, and eﬃcient social assistance scheme.
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Challenges
Insider-outsider dynamics
While the central role of the state as both provider of welfare and a major employer has created
relatively large distributive coalitions  which explains the overall satisfactory outcome perform-
ance across the region  these coalitions are characterised by strong barriers between insiders,
consisting of public sector employees and weakly developed formal private sector, and outsiders,
consisting of workers in the informal sectors which typically encompasses between 25 and 60 per-
cent of all non-agricultural workers (Hertog, 2016). Labour market segmentation is reinforced by
a comparatively weak labour turnover of about 10 percent of the work force per annum (World
Bank, 2013).
In the ﬁeld of social policies, this insider-outsider divide underpins the underdevelopment
or underfunding of universal social security and assistance schemes, whereas welfare beneﬁts
for labour market insiders are comparatively generous. This is particularly conspicuous with
regard to pension schemes, which oﬀer manifold possibilities for early retirement and in some
countries replacement rates which exceed the last income, that is, above 100 percent (Hertog,
2016). This means that social security systems across the region not only suﬀer from weak vertical
redistribution between well-oﬀ and vulnerable groups in society, but also from a pronounced
intergenerational redistribution from the working age population to pensioners.
Attempts to attenuate this insider-outsider divide have been made  for instance, by oﬀering
voluntary membership in the social security schemes to informal workers, such as in Tunisia 
but fundamental reforms toward more universally accessible policies have often been deterred by
insider groups, who in the MENA region have quite a lot to lose. Segmenting the labour market
has also been in the interest of regimes which have made divide and rule strategies a mainstay of
their power. In turn, outsiders struggle to ﬁnd meaningful political representation in the absence
of democratic competition in most countries and labour unions failing to represent the informal
sector.
Ineﬃcient targeting
Another challenge of social policies in the Middle East is targeting as many policies fail to reach
vulnerable groups in society. On the one hand, this is a correlate of the segmented nature of
existing social security systems which  being designed for and used by labour market insiders 
primarily reach a middle class constituency. On the other hand, even universally accessible social
beneﬁts are often primarily reaped by middle- and upper-income groups. This is particularly true
for the most widely used social transfer  energy and food subsidies.
As regards energy subsidies, numerous studies have highlighted the regressive distributive
eﬀect of all forms of energy subsidies, be it petrol, gas, or electricity, as richer households propor-
tionally consume more energy than poorer ones and tend to be better connected to the national
electricity grid. Using household survey data, a recent IMF study (IMF, 2014) indeed found
that the bottom 40 percent of the population typically only receive between 15 and 30 percent
of energy subsidies (Figure 4a). The system thus clearly represent a distributive mechanism in
favour of the well-oﬀ.
As for food subsidies, it has rightly been pointed out that the availability of aﬀordable basic
commodities has contributed to the region's good performance in terms of malnutrition. As
Cammett et al. (2015) point out, merely 8.3 percent of the MENA population suﬀer from
malnutrition compared to 12.2 percent in East Asia, 21.1 percent in sub-Saharan Africa, and
33.1 percent in South Asia. That said, this outcome seems more like a side eﬀect of a system
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which  similar to energy subsidies  has been designed to beneﬁt a predominantly middle class
constituency. Typically between 40 to 50 percent of all food subsidies go to the top two income
quintiles, while the bottom 40 percent receive less than their fair share of the food subsidy bill
(Figure 4b). In addition to this regressive income eﬀect, food subsidies are also problematic
from a viewpoint of regional equity as they chieﬂy beneﬁt urban agglomerations with higher food
consumption, whereas particularly bread subsidies are often of no use to poor rural households
who supply their own bread.
(a) Share of energy subsidies beneﬁting the bottom
40 percent of the population
(b) Share of food subsidies beneﬁting the bottom 40
percent of the population
Figure 4: Distributive eﬀects of energy and food subsidies
Source: IMF 2014, 13-14.
The reasons for the persistence of this suboptimal system again lie in the political economy
dynamic underpinning it: middle class beneﬁciaries are generally better organised and politically
more valuable in authoritarian systems where quelling urban unrest is crucial. In addition, it is
often overlooked that the subsidy system is supported by a signiﬁcant group of actors involved
in the supply side of subsidies. First, public sector employees working in subsidy-related sectors,
such as the vast public milling sector in Egypt, have shown a high capacity to mobilise against
any attempt to increase competition between public and private sector producers of ﬂour as they,
probably rightly, fear that the over-staﬀed public mills would not be able to compete with the
private sector. On the other hand, traders and merchants of subsidised goods have beneﬁted
handsomely from the market distortions that the subsidisation system provides. For example,
wheat traders compete with the public sector agency (GASC) for the purchase of locally produced
wheat; yet, by law, GASC is required to eventually buy up all locally produced wheat, which
means traders sell their stock back to GASC, which drives up the prices and hands a lucrative
proﬁt to this group of intermediaries. Finally, the subsidy system has also been increasingly
exploited by a group of politically connected actors who, like in Egypt and Tunisia, preferentially
establish their companies in sectors beneﬁting from energy subsidies or receive exclusive licences
to produce subsidised goods, such as sugar (Eibl, 2016). In combination, this factors have greatly
complicated meaningful change toward a more equitable and eﬃcient social safety system.
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Distributive expectations
A third social policy challenge that all governments of the region have to deal with is the remark-
able distributive expectations toward the state which are rooted in the real and perceived legacy
of populist distribution. As regimes since the 1950s have made the promise to provide welfare
and often also employment a mainstay of their legitimacy, citizens in the region have come to
measure their governments by these very standards. However, even though many governments
have clearly been unable to deliver on their promise since the mid-1970s, these expectations have
been remarkably persistent.
For example, in the most recent World Value Survey nearly 35 percent fully agreed with the
statement that the government is responsible everybody is provided for (Figure 5a). This puts
the MENA region ahead of all other regions, including those with a signiﬁcant communist legacy
in Central Asia and Europe. In a similar vein, in nearly all MENA states 50 percent or more
of all graduates have a preference for government jobs, with university graduates on top in a
number of countries (Figure 5b). Given the inability of most countries to signiﬁcantly widen
the pool of labour market insiders in the short- to medium-term, making social policies more
eﬀective in reaching beyond insider groups will be key for governments to address the distributive
expectations of their populations.
(a) Preferences for government provision
Source: WVS 2012.
(b) Preferences for a government job
Source: Hertog 2016, 25.
Figure 5: Distributive expectations across the MENA region
Note: Respondents were asked if the `Government [is] responsible that everybody is provided for?'
on a 10-point scale. Percentages in graph represent share of those who `agree completely.'
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